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Post by spokker on Sept 12, 2008 20:51:17 GMT -8
First NIMBY resident is on the news now complaining about the tracks and how fast the freight trains go. He says he "noticed" they go too fast and that he's concerned for his safety.
Holy moly this guy's nuts. The reporter actually mentioned that the tracks were there before his house was, but he isn't having any of that!
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Post by nickv on Sept 12, 2008 22:27:08 GMT -8
11:00 PM Update:
At least 15 people are confirmed to have passed on and at least 135 others have been injured according to news sources.
The two trains collided head-on with such force that the lead passenger car was wrapped around the Metrolink locomotive. Based on photographs from the news stories, it appears that about 1/2 of the interior of the lead car was crushed by the locomotive.
The number of fatalities makes this the deadliest Metrolink crash in the history of the Los Angeles area's commuter railroad; 11 people passed on and 180 others were injured in the January 26, 2005 wreck.
Family Assistance Center for families of passengers at Chatsworth High School 10027 Lurline Avenue. The hotline number at the Chatsworth High School Family Assistance Center is (818) 678-3422.
Phone Numbers to Call (from Metrolink's Website)
Family members of passengers on board train 111, please call (800) 371-LINK for information.
L.A. Fire Dept. has released the following two numbers to call for information on hospital patients:
(213) 847-2117 and (213) 847-2118
Support & Blood Donations Update:
Red Cross officials say blood needs for those injured are believed to have been met, but donors are needed to replenish the supplies that have been used.
Any person 17 years or older—16 if accompanied by a parent—and weighing at least 110 pounds is eligible to donate blood. Eligible donors are asked to schedule an appointment to donate by calling 1-800-GIVE LIFE or by visiting the Give Life Web Site.
As an alternative, the UCLA Blood and Platelet Center will be open tomorrow (9/13) from 8 a.m.-1 p.m. to accept blood donations. Appointments can be made by calling (310) 794-7217.
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Post by nickv on Sept 12, 2008 23:29:13 GMT -8
Does anybody think the following idea might work in the future to prevent head-on train wrecks?
All freight and passenger train locomotives would have a computerized safety feature installed where the trains will slow and stop automatically/remotely if either a collision risk is detected or the engineer runs a red light. The at-risk trains would all stop. I believe the SPRINTER is equipped with an automated stop feature if the trains exceed a certain speed.
If anybody has seen the film Garfield: The Movie, there is a LAUS scene where Garfield tinkers with a dispatcher control panel, messes up the train system, thus causing several trains to be in danger of colliding. He finds and presses a red button which stops all of the trains before they do collide.
The point I'm trying to bring up is this: If a dispatcher's computer detects a collision warning or if an engineer rolls through a red light, the computer or dispatcher would remotely stop all of the trains at risk.
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Post by Gokhan on Sept 12, 2008 23:37:30 GMT -8
The collision happened on a blind curve near the entrance of a single-track tunnel. See the bird's-eye view of the accident site.  Above picture shows the aftermath. The tracks for the Metrolink train going north were changing from double to single shortly before the accident site, where it was headed into the first mountain tunnel. For the southbound freight train, the tracks had changed from double to single a long way ago when it entered the series of mountain passes and tunnels. It's unbelievable that this has happened. Signaling error? Totally oblivious Metrolink engineer? Foul play? Most likely the second one, perhaps with a combination of the first one (lack of an alarm system when running a red light?). It's very sad that so many people got killed and hurt. |
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Post by kingsfan on Sept 13, 2008 5:07:03 GMT -8
"i hope this is a wake-up call for single track sharing with freight trains"
This just as likely could have been an inbound Metrolink, so I am not sure we can attribute anything to the fact one of the trains was carrying freight. Also, due to proximity to the Santa Susana Tunnel, i doubt this section of track will ever become double, thus eliminating that too as a solution.
Regardless, i ride that specific train often so my thoughts and prayers go out to all on board.
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Post by Transit Coalition on Sept 13, 2008 5:12:25 GMT -8
The collision happened on a blind curve near the entrance of a single-track tunnel. See the bird's-eye view of the accident site. Above picture shows the aftermath. The tracks for the Metrolink train going north were changing from double to single shortly before the accident site, where it was headed into the first mountain tunnel. For the southbound freight train, the tracks had changed from double to single a long way ago when it entered the series of mountain passes and tunnels. It's unbelievable that this has happened. Signaling error? Totally oblivious Metrolink engineer? Foul play? Most likely the second one, perhaps with a combination of the first one (lack of an alarm system when running a red light?). It's very sad that so many people got killed and hurt. Factually, the Union Pacific freight train was in proper position, about 4 minutes away from pulling in to the passsing track. It won't be known until after the National Transportation Safety Board investigation what happened officially, but there are two simple choices on what happened: a. The Metrolink #111 engineer left Chatsworth, without knowledge of the oncoming UP freight due to a dispatch mistake and a incorrect signal. b. Metrolink #111 ignored or missed the red signal. Either way, it was some type of human error. There are black boxes that record all these events and at some point we will learn what terrible mistake took place. Right now, recovery efforts must be completed and the accident site will be cleaned up after NTSB investigation is complete and the tracks are released back to Metrolink for recovery and rebuilding of the railroad. |
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Post by metrocenter on Sept 13, 2008 7:18:26 GMT -8
Oh how horrible. Prayers to all those that died or lived through this catastrophe.
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Post by jejozwik on Sept 13, 2008 8:16:01 GMT -8
This just as likely could have been an inbound Metrolink, so I am not sure we can attribute anything to the fact one of the trains was carrying freight. Also, due to proximity to the Santa Susana Tunnel, i doubt this section of track will ever become double, thus eliminating that too as a solution. you are correct. i should have chose a different word. i really think there needs to be some kind of overhaul to the metrolink system. as i understand it when metrolink was built it was just slapped along with current freight lines and little to no new track was built. this same systems exist about 3 times on the san bernandino line, and i would hate to see the same sort of thing happen there. Does anybody think the following idea might work in the future to prevent head-on train wrecks? The point I'm trying to bring up is this: If a dispatcher's computer detects a collision warning or if an engineer rolls through a red light, the computer or dispatcher would remotely stop all of the trains at risk. adding a computer system to a so called "fail safe system" would still just be delaying the inevitable, i believe. the only way to make certain this could not happen again is stop the practice of single tracking. it may work well out in lancaster, but there are just to many people that could get killed with accidents like this on heavily used urban rail. |
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Post by jejozwik on Sept 13, 2008 8:17:15 GMT -8
also, has anyone else noticed this is the same tunnel that had the car fall from the nearby road onto the track? it was about a month or so ago. googlemap |
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Post by James Fujita on Sept 13, 2008 8:29:29 GMT -8
First NIMBY resident is on the news now complaining about the tracks and how fast the freight trains go. He says he "noticed" they go too fast and that he's concerned for his safety. Holy moly this guy's nuts. The reporter actually mentioned that the tracks were there before his house was, but he isn't having any of that! wow, the first NIMBY came out quickly. not to take anything away from this tragedy, but I actually found myself thinking about the whole push train vs. pull thing, which is a silly argument but one that seems to never die. then there's the double-track idea, which would be admittedly hard - perhaps even impossible? - in the Santa Susana Pass but I've always supported the idea whenever and wherever possible. but the best solution to preventing future disasters like this one would be better signaling. I like the idea of automatic stops... eliminate the possibility of human error. but for now, my thoughts are with the families of the victims. |
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Post by jejozwik on Sept 13, 2008 8:33:54 GMT -8
google map of possible prevention measurea bit of tunnel boring under an area of low build up from an agency that has a huge fairbox recovery to prevent future deaths / interruption in service / decreasing public support seems like a no-brainer
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Post by Justin Walker on Sept 13, 2008 10:00:49 GMT -8
This one will be hard to piece together with the Metrolink engineer no longer being with us. From what I've heard, the status of the the UP engineers hasn't been released. Has anyone heard otherwise?
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Post by Gokhan on Sept 13, 2008 10:23:28 GMT -8
Factually, the Union Pacific freight train was in proper position, about 4 minutes away from pulling in to the passsing track. Actually, it was only about 30 seconds away. The freight train, traveling around 25 - 30 MPH was only a quarter mile away from the single-track/double-track switch when the collision happened. The switch itself is one mile away from the Chatsworth Station. |
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Post by Gokhan on Sept 13, 2008 10:27:59 GMT -8
not to take anything away from this tragedy, but I actually found myself thinking about the whole push train vs. pull thing, which is a silly argument but one that seems to never die. The Metrolink train involved in the accident was going in the pull mode; so, push mode is not to blame in this acident. The catastrophic nature of the accident in this case resulted from the mismatch of the masses of the huge freight train and Metrolink train, which is like a tiny toy train compared to the freight train. As a result, the Metrolink train effectively hit a solid wall. |
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Post by Gokhan on Sept 13, 2008 10:29:45 GMT -8
This one will be hard to piece together with the Metrolink engineer no longer being with us. From what I've heard, the status of the the UP engineers hasn't been released. Has anyone heard otherwise? The UP crew is fine of course, thanks to the mass mismatch between the two trains. The collision was in that sense similar to a train - car collision. |
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Post by Gokhan on Sept 13, 2008 10:32:05 GMT -8
google map of possible prevention measurea bit of tunnel boring under an area of low build up from an agency that has a huge fairbox recovery to prevent future deaths / interruption in service / decreasing public support seems like a no-brainer It's not just the short tunnel you Google-mapped. The entire segment between Simi Valley and Chatsworth is single-track, thanks to the mountains. In addition to the eastmost tunnel, there is another short tunnel like that one and a very long tunnel toward Simi Valley. |
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Post by Gokhan on Sept 13, 2008 10:34:00 GMT -8
Here are more details and perspective:
Confirmed:
The freight train involved was UP's LOF65 "Leesdale Local" which runs roundtrip between Van Nuys (Gemco) and Oxnard in daylight hours M-F. The lead locomotive involved turned over on it's left conductor side is the UP8485, the trailing unit left upright is the UP8491. The Leesdale has just recently been converted to using more modern 2-year old EMD SD70ACes for locomotive power instead of the standard three EMD 6-axle Dash-2's that it's used for power over the last 10+ years. This little factor might have saved the UP crews lives (read on).
The eastbound freight train or UP8485 East was traveling downgrade coming out of the short Tunnel #28 (which runs under Topanga Canyon Road) before collision with the passenger train. At impact it was about halfway through the somewhat tight 90º Coastline mainline curve that turns due South through Chatsworth before turning back East towards Burbank.
The Westbound Metrolink passenger train or Ventura Line Train #111 had left L.A. Union Passenger Terminal (LAUPT) at 3:35p and was scheduled to depart the Amtrak/Chatsworth Station at 4:16p (but was most likely running a little late). Per the norm for trains that have departed out of LAUPT, it had EMD F59PH locomotive SCAX855 leading first or in "pull mode" (the opposite direction "push" mode has the cabcar leading first and locomotive pushing backwards) with the standard Ventura Line three Bombardier-built commuter cars in tow.
Reported time of the UP-SCAX head-on impact was 4:23p.
~~~
Speculation:
As you an see from many of the photos, the force of the mostly loaded freight train upon head-on impact transferred into the lighter Metrolink train locomotive. These intense moving bodies forces as shown appear to have picked up the Metrolink locomotive off of it's front trucks (wheels), sheering off it's fuel tank in the process and pushed the F59PH backwards into the interior of the first passenger car. This telescoping effect is the most shocking part of the collision events - just picture being someone onboard the front car. At collision impact, passengers would have been flung forward while at the same time taking place in milliseconds the rear end of the heavy full width "cowl" locomotive carbody (containing full engine block, generators, radiators and other powerplant components) would be coming back at you as force pushed through the punctured front end of of the lead car. The full passenger car estimates of Metrolink #111 at normal scheduled
capacity would be 75-120 passengers. Half of that passenger car rests tonight with a locomotive pushed through it's hollow core.
Expect the passenger death toll to rise overnight.
Although this accident may seem eerily similar to the failed Suicide SUV versus Metrolink train wreck in Glendale, CA from January 26, 2005, there are a few obvious differences in the details. Friday afternoon's Chatsworth wreck involved a moving train versus moving train head-on collision with much greater combined speed forces. Unlike the Glendale incident, the heavily damaged front commuter car from Metrolink train #111 is a "welded" body panel late phase design and not the early phase "bolted" panel design. The bolted panel design had been partially blamed for aiding in some passenger deaths in 2005 due to how the side carbody wall panels sheered apart.
Unconfirmed reports on RR discussion board now state that the UP freight was lined into the CP Chatsworth siding with a "clear diverging" signal or low green light at West switch Chatsworth. This would support a few speculation theories based on the presented facts, impact location and specific timing of the head-on collision that the Metrolink engineer (who runs solo in the cab) ran past his red light shortly after departing the scheduled Chatsworth station stop. This would also mean running through a switch lined against his train's movement for the approaching freight. As noted, this human error theory is still pure speculation as it is WAY too early to rule out computer, signal or some other technical malfunction. We'll have to wait a few months (or years) for the NTSB to release their report.
~~~
My prayers go to the UP/SCAX crews involved as well as the passengers aboard Metrolink #111 and thousands of family members worried about their loved ones watching the aftermath of this scene from every angle via L.A. news media.
Also keep your thoughts with the hundreds of rescue L.A.P.D, L.A. Sheriff, L.A.F.D., EMT and UPRR/Metrolink authorities on scene trying to save peoples lives and recover passengers in this mess. If it were not for their efforts to rescue organize on the fly in complete chaos hell, there would be certainly be many more fatalities.
-Ryan M. Martin aka "espeeboy"
on the ex-SP Martinez Sub MP6.2
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Post by jejozwik on Sept 13, 2008 10:58:59 GMT -8
It's not just the short tunnel you Google-mapped. The entire segment between Simi Valley and Chatsworth is single-track, thanks to the mountains. i did not realize the portion i saw of the double track was a standing area. thought it was that way for the remainder of the line. still after reading you second post about a possible equipment failure. im leaning more towards a double track scenario being the only cure. In addition to the eastmost tunnel, there is another short tunnel like that one and a very long tunnel toward Simi Valley. yes i know of the 3 tunnels there, ending at corriganvill park. what i had shown was that a new, westbound single track tunnel to be used with the existing tunnels to make the equivalent of a double track tunnel. this would eliminate the need to rely on computers and human input into the system. |
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Post by Gokhan on Sept 13, 2008 11:11:43 GMT -8
Metrolink engineer at fault in fatal crashMetrolink officials said an engineer on the Metrolink train that collided with a freight train ignored a signal telling him to stop.
Had the engineer stopped, the accident would not have occurred, said Metrolink spokeswoman Denise Tyrrell.Could there also be foul play on the Metrolink engineer's side?
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Post by Gokhan on Sept 13, 2008 12:15:09 GMT -8
This one will be hard to piece together with the Metrolink engineer no longer being with us. From what I've heard, the status of the the UP engineers hasn't been released. Has anyone heard otherwise? The UP crew is fine of course, thanks to the mass mismatch between the two trains. The collision was in that sense similar to a train - car collision. Actually, it looks like I was wrong. Apparently the body of the UP conductor was pulled from the flipped engine. The death toll is now at 25. |
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vnc
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Post by vnc on Sept 13, 2008 17:22:25 GMT -8
This one will be hard to piece together with the Metrolink engineer no longer being with us. From what I've heard, the status of the the UP engineers hasn't been released. Has anyone heard otherwise? The UP crew is fine of course, thanks to the mass mismatch between the two trains. The collision was in that sense similar to a train - car collision. I think. The UP Unit may have or had a Dash Cam. Alot of the new Locomotives are now coming with a Camera mounted to the Dashboard. I was asking some people I know. If the new SD70 Models have the Dash Cams or not. Some people are telling me yes. They do have the Dash Cam. Also The Leesdale Local. Does not always have the SD70s. I seen this train in the past. With older SD45s and Tunnelmotors. Just depends what they have at GEMCO. |
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Post by spokker on Sept 13, 2008 17:32:40 GMT -8
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Post by wrcousert on Sept 13, 2008 17:48:34 GMT -8
I was discussing the accident with a couple coworkers. One of them said he'd ride in the back car if he ever rode Metrolink.
Is the back car the safest place to be?
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Post by Gokhan on Sept 13, 2008 18:10:38 GMT -8
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vnc
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Post by vnc on Sept 13, 2008 18:41:14 GMT -8
There isn't any official word yet on the text messaging. The NTSB is going to look at that. And look at other things as well.
As to the safest place to sit on a Train. There is no study or reports that say. Sitting at the end of a car or in the middle is safer. Every accident is Difference.
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Post by spokker on Sept 13, 2008 18:42:57 GMT -8
I'm sorry but those tributes are ridiculous. What kind of railfan would interact with an engineer by phone while they are operating a train? And these kids expect to become engineers someday? How will they if they think this is the right way to act? I'm too angry right now. These railfans infuriate me. There isn't any official word yet on the text messaging. But the fact is that he was doing it. There are pictures to prove it. That in and of itself boils my blood. So when I hop on a train I have to check to see if the engineer is texting his rail buddies now? This is bullshit. |
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Post by Gokhan on Sept 13, 2008 19:35:49 GMT -8
While it's completely unacceptable an illegal to use a cell phone while driving a train, especially to text, the story of Rob Sanchez brings a warm side to this horrific tragedy. We all now know that both the UP engineers and Metrolink engineer were all dedicated to their job and loved by the locals -- they were part of the daily life there. But then something went terribly wrong and many lives have been shattered.
I still suspect an error in the Metrolink's dispatching system. The train should have never left the Chatswoth Station, one and a quarter miles back from the accident site, in the first place because the UP train was already in the single-track section while the Metrolink train was sitting at the station. It could well be that the dispatchers were late in activating the red lights, or perhaps they didn't activate them at all and the lights were green all the time. It might be that the texting really had nothing to do with the accident.
But this shows at the end that the Metrolink trains are lacking an automatic failsafe system. Any system that relies on dispatchers and engineers alone is destined to fail at one point because humans commonly make mistakes.
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Post by spokker on Sept 13, 2008 19:54:33 GMT -8
the story of Rob Sanchez brings a warm side to this horrific tragedy. We all now know that both the UP engineers and Metrolink engineer were all dedicated to their job and loved by the locals -- they were part of the daily life there. But then something went terribly wrong and many lives have been shattered. What went horribly wrong was when this engineer took it upon himself to start interacting with worthless foamers. I'm sorry, but I don't get warm fuzzies when I think about this guy. We'll find out whether or not the texting had more to do with this incident, but it shouldn't be happening period. As a Metrolink rider it is completely unacceptable for these engineers to be patronizing railfans while on the job. I expect a professional operation for what I pay with my fare AND tax dollars. If it becomes apparent that this is the norm I will seriously reconsider riding Metrolink. |
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Post by Gokhan on Sept 13, 2008 20:05:52 GMT -8
What went horribly wrong was when this engineer took it upon himself to start interacting with worthless foamers. We don't know for sure. My guess is that what really went wrong was the dispatchers being late in activating the red lights or not activating them at all. There were three signals on the way. He couldn't miss all three, texting or not.As I said in my very first post on this tragic incident, the real culprit is the 19th Century signaling technolgy still used in Los Angeles, instead of the modern train-control systems: Control devices could have prevented Metrolink crash, experts sayThe NTSB for decades has recommended collision-avoidance devices for corridors where passenger and freight trains use the same track. Railroads say the technology costs too much and isn't reliable.
By Dan Weikel and Steve Hymon, Los Angeles Times Staff Writers
September 14, 2008Friday's disastrous collision that took the lives of at least 25 people could have been prevented if Metrolink and the region's freight railroads had installed sophisticated warning and control devices, according to safety experts who have been calling for such improvements for decades. The National Transportation Safety Board, which investigates crashes and recommends ways to avoid them, began calling for the technology 30 years ago, after a train wreck in Louisiana. The safety board has repeatedly advocated the technology for high-risk corridors where freight and passenger trains operate side by side. Southern California has more freight trains and commuter trains sharing tracks than any other place in the United States. But railroads and commuter lines here have not installed the technology, which is in use in parts of the Northeast and routes between Chicago and Detroit. Railroad officials have said the collision avoidance systems, known as positive train control, cost too much and are not yet reliable enough to install nationwide. That response frustrates safety experts. "I'm not surprised that once again there has been a terrible, preventable train collision," said Barry M Sweedler, a former senior director of the NTSB, who retired after 31 years. "It's extremely frustrating. They know what to do to solve these things." The Federal Railroad Administration estimates that putting positive train control on 100,000 miles of track nationwide would cost more than $2.3 billion. Currently, about 4,000 miles are covered. Metrolink officials said they did not have cost estimates for installing controls on their system. Positive train control combines digital communications with Global Positioning System technology to monitor train locations and speeds. If engineers fail to comply with signals, which Metrolink says was the case in the Chatsworth accident, the electronic devices automatically apply the brakes. The sophisticated systems can detect speed-limit violations, improperly aligned switches, unauthorized train movements and whether trains are on the wrong track or have missed signals to slow or stop. It does not warn crews about obstacles on tracks. The systems are "applicable any place you have freight and passenger trains occupying the same track," said William Keppen, a railroad consultant based in Annapolis, Md. "You need to look at putting them in areas with the highest risks. The Los Angeles area is exactly what we are talking about." Francisco Oaxaca, a Metrolink spokesman, said Metrolink does not use positive train control because of the complexity of its track system, which is shared by Union Pacific Railroad and Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railway Corp. He contends that to be effective, positive train control systems would need to be installed nationwide because freight trains move across the country. Metrolink is "on the forefront of safety enhancements," Oaxaca said, and would not hesitate to use any technology that worked across different railroad systems. Positive train controls "don't exist in any form currently in this country other than test installations in limited locations or as pilot programs," Oaxaca said, adding that "I think every railroad operator has looked into it." According to the Federal Railroad Administration, positive train control projects exist at nine railroads in at least 16 states, but not in California. The railroad administration asked its safety advisory committee to address positive train control in 1997. The agency has said in the past that railroads, labor unions and the agency's own staff have agreed that the costs of the systems outweigh the safety benefits. Railroad industry representatives said developing positive train control has taken so long because of high costs and reliability problems. Hundreds of millions have been invested in research, they said. Edward R. Hamberger, president of the Assn. of American Railroads, the industry's trade organization, said one of the technical challenges is designing a uniform system that works across the nation's 140,000 miles of track. He also said the devices can give false readings and that railroads don't quite know how much distance should be maintained between trains. "Technical problems remain, but we are getting them worked out," Hamberger said. "You just can't put something out there and hope it works. It has to be proven." The NTSB said that automated warning systems were needed to compensate for human error. The safety board has investigated a long list of train accidents in which operator fatigue, sleep disorders, medications, inattentiveness or mistakes in judgment led to accidents. The board has power to investigate and make recommendations after crashes. It cannot order federal agencies to take action. The safety board first called for positive train control systems in 1976 after the engineer of a Texas & Pacific Railroad freight train rear-ended a stopped freight train in Meeker, La. In that case, the engineer had overlooked a stop signal. In 1990, the safety board added positive control technology to its list of most-wanted safety improvements for the transportation industry. The board strongly repeated its call after a deadly train crash on April 23, 2002, in Placentia. In that crash, safety board investigators concluded that the Burlington Northern engineer and conductor were talking to each other and had failed to see a yellow signal warning them to slow down and prepare to stop. Their train slammed into a stopped Metrolink commuter train. Three passengers died and more than 260 were injured. Sweedler, who played a major role in adding positive train controls to the board's wish list, contends that the railroad industry has used the same financial and technical excuses for decades to avoid paying for the systems. "In Alaska they are installing it. It operates on the Northeast corridor. It operates between Chicago and Detroit. The systems work," he said. Sweedler blamed the lack of progress on political pressure brought by railroads on Congress and the Federal Railroad Administration, something railroad officials deny. "What they are saying is that they are willing to accept a certain number of these tragedies every year," Sweedler said. "This doesn't make any sense. Let's put some backbone into this. There is so much that can be achieved." dan.weikel@latimes.com
steve.hymon@latimes.com |
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Post by spokker on Sept 13, 2008 20:16:10 GMT -8
There were three signals on the way. He couldn't miss all three, texting or not. Like I said before, even if the texting had nothing to do with the incident, I am still very angry about it. Time will tell whether my anger is justified or even rational. I don't challenge anything else you've put forth. |
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